"The Wrong War"

Bing West's "The Wrong War," on Afghanistan strategy

March 4, 2011 - In a new book about the war in Afghanistan, distinguished military affairs writer Bing West argues that hazy objectives, bad political assumptions and a long strategic muddle have burned away whatever structure of success American grunts have built on the battlefield. In this telling, tactical excellence and the considerable courage of frontline troops are forever being rendered nugatory by failed leadership.

West spreads the blame widely, but finds a failure of political culture at the heart of the problem. Endlessly engaged in euphemism and rhetorical triangulation, American generals and politicians insist on a story in which war isn't war, and doesn't center on killing. Official doctrine instead declares that professional warriors are engaged in a nation-building strategy "to serve and secure the population," a focus that West argues has "transformed the military into a giant Peace Corps."

Few leaders are spared. Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pronounces that "we can't kill our way to victory" in a counterinsurgency. West's judgment: "That was political drivel." He writes that "the senior ranks were determined to sell counterinsurgency as benevolent nation building," a politically motivated story that promised to minimize domestic opposition.

While he speaks poorly of most military leaders, West argues that the "political drivel" started at the top. Former President George W. Bush "proclaimed his messianic belief that all peoples desired freedom, regardless of the cultural context," wading into war without a clear idea of what it would entail. As a result of this unrealistic organizing vision, the Bush administration "did not have a coherent strategy and was riven by internal dissension." The effective prosecution of a war requires that it be organized with achievable objectives that grow from realistic expectations. Here was the first in a long string of failures. {continued}